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Introduction  
 
The existence of the right to secession, as well as its legal basis and application have been a 
subject to extensive debates for decades among many scholars and lawyers. However, 
throughout the years, neither scholars nor the states could come to a common consensus in the 
question of secession, its connection to self-determination and moreover, the use of force in 
cases of armed interventions, as a consequence of previously mentioned phenomena. In order to 
understand the whole problematic and vagueness of law over the process of secession, it is 
required to analyse the issues related to it. This thesis will not argue about the right to external 
self-determination regarding colonial peoples, but instead will bring up and analyse a keen and 
important issue of unilateral non-colonial secession1  of peoples and minorities.  
First and foremost, the collision with the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
states remains the toughest obstacle on the way of secession to become an official right.2 In 
addition, there is a question whether the right to self-determination should be regarded as a legal 
basis for secession. While analysing the connection between statehood and self-determination, it 
is important, for this study, to take into account opinions of various scholars, to underline the 
academic value and difference of this thesis compared to other studies. For example, Crawford 
states that “self-determination, is at the most basic level, a principle concerned with the right to 
be a State.”3 However, as argued by Crawford himself, as well as others, for example Anderson, 
secession is not the best and easiest way of creation of States.4 The process of secession is rather 
complicated and requires more contextual approach in conjunction with various combinations of 
interpretations of relevant provisions.  
￼ While the thesis will analyse the precedents and ongoing cases, it will become clear that, 
regardless the Crawford’s definition of creation of states, secession, as an independent 
phenomenon, leads to various outcomes which depend on a number of variables. For example, 
                                                          
1 Hereinafter: UNC Secession  
2 L. Glanville, The Responsibility to Protect Beyond Borders” (2012) 12:1 Human Rights L Rev 1 p. 32. 
3 J. R Crawford, The Creation of States in International Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2006) p. 107 
4 G. Anderson, “Secession in International Law and Relations: What Are We Talking About?” (2013) 
35:3 Loy LA Intl & Comp L Rev 34, p. 343-4 
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according to Kohen, secession is a complex process which involves a lot of various stages, 
however none of those can guarantee the creation of new state.5 Therefore, since there is no 
certain definition and description of the process of secession, it is still a subject to profound 
analysis. Taking into account all the ongoing debates for disputed territories and secessionist 
movements, the process of secession must be defined if not precisely, then at least with certain 
possible scenarios and outcomes. These statements will be tested in this thesis, while the author 
will analyse the key precedents of secession involving different and similar patterns but yet 
diverse outcomes and responds.  
What’s more, Crawford describes the process of secession as an act of violence and use of force 
in order to achieve its outcomes: “secession is the creation of a State by the use or threat of force 
without the consent of the former sovereign…”6 Therefore, Crowford defines secession as one 
continuous act which has a certain “lifetime” and outcome, which also finds its 
acknowledgement in works of John Dugard and Alexis Heraclides.7 However, the author will 
argue with this statement, using the case studies of Kosovo, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Crimea 
as to demonstrate that the secession is a process with various scenarios and results and does not 
have a certain lifetime, but yet prove the statement that it is a violent process without the consent 
of the mother-state.  
The hypothesis is that it is impossible to have a certain process with distinguished patterns and 
outcomes if there is no proper legal regulation for it, which could significantly reduce the level 
of violence in similar situations.  
The research problem is that the so-called right to secession collides with two integral principles 
of international law, which are: the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. In other words, 
non-colonial unilateral secession is still unclear as a right under international law, therefore the 
necessary scale of violations of human rights is not legally regulated. 
                                                          
5 M. Kohen, ed, Secession: International Law Perspectives (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2006) p.14 
6 Crawford, “The Creation of States”, note 3,P. 375  
7 See: J. Dugard, “A Legal Basis for Secession – Relevant Principles and Rules” in J. Dahlitz, ed, 
Secession and International Law: Conflict Avoidance – Regional Appraisals Hague: TMC Asser Press, 
2003 p. 89; A. Heraclides, The Self-Determination of Minorities in International Politics (New Jersey: F 
Cass Publishing, 1990) p.1 
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One of the key research questions concerning the secession itself is: Secession, is it a remedial 
legal right prescribed by interpretation of international custom or a result of political 
speculations? As a supporting question, the author finds it important to determine, whether the 
unilateral non-colonial secession includes in itself the initiation and a certain outcome or it is a 
separate process which leads to various outcomes? 
Another research question of this thesis is highly interdependent with the first one, therefore, as a 
result their answers will provide one holistic explanations of secession as a legal phenomenon. 
Since national minorities, living on a territory of a sovereign state, are entitled to its domestic 
law and therefore are under protection of the State, there comes a question of protection of those 
minorities in cases of oppression by the State. While both international and national law are 
designed to protect national minorities granting them "internal" self-determination, there are still 
numerous cases of secessionist movements both successful and not. On the other hand, there are 
peoples which still live on a territory of various states, but yet are not completely satisfied with 
their position. Therefore, it is crucial to answer, whether the right to self-determination may or 
may not serve as a legal justification for secession and what may be the consequences of using 
such a reference?  
The objective of this thesis is to determine the existence or non-existence of the right to 
secession and its application as a last resort in cases of violation of fundamental human rights of 
national minorities. Notably, to establish certain points of violations of human rights which may 
possible trigger the process of secession without the consent of the state. Therefore, this work 
will focus on the right to Unilateral non-colonial secession under international law and 
possibility of exploiting the principle of self-determination as a legal basis for it.  
First, the analysis will touch upon the principle of self-determination itself, as a fundamental 
principle of international law. Next, the author will use the analytical method provide for a 
causal link between the principle of self-determination and the UNC secession as its outcome. 
Conversely, the second part of the first chapter will present an opposing theory which will try to 
deny any causal links between self-determination and secession. While making a comparison of 
two existing theories, the author will discuss existing cases under the scope of each theory and 
derive all influencing factors necessary to establish the existence or non-existence of such a right 
which would allow to secede unilaterally. Finally, putting the theories into certain context of case 
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studies, the author will use the method of contextualization in order to establish the most realistic 
and relevant aspects of both theories. This thesis will analyse different cases of UNC Secession, 
specifically the aspect of human rights violations and invoked legal justifications for it. Finally, 
by taking into account all variables the author will determine the scale of human right violations, 
political impacts and use of force by third parties, which took place throughout the period of 
secession for chosen cases. The author will use a comparative analysis in order to determine 
certain patterns of human rights violations in taken cases of Crimea and Kosovo as the main 
examples for this thesis, while support the analysis with cases South Ossetia and Abkhazia. All 
cases will be used to contextualize the findings of the first part.  
Since self-determination is one of the most fundamental principles of international law which 
acquired its status of customary law a long time ago, it is regarded as a peremptory norm. 
However, the definition and conditions of secession in international law are highly vague and 
leave a lot of space for debates. There is, however, a reason for this, which plays a key role for 
this research and will be discussed in detail.8  
Such examples as Kosovo, South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Crimea have shown the world that this 
specific interpretation of the principle of self-determination may trigger unauthorized use of 
force and intervention. So, the author finds it appropriate to discuss the problem of military 
intervention as an integral part of secession. The main argument here is the principle of non-
recognition, when states have an obligation to abstain from recognition of those territories that 
acquired independence through use of force. For example, South Ossetia and Abkhazia are still 
questioned to be legal since the international law does not clearly provide for their positions.9 
Therefore, the paper is going to discuss the situation when the national minority is constantly 
facing violation of human rights as in extremis10 which is regarded as violation of the right to 
internal self-determination and the legality of secession, as well as available tools and methods to 
implement it without use of force.  
The legal basis for this work will be formed by the most relevant sources of international law, 
state practice and case-law. In order to prove the legal basis for the right to UNC secession, this 
                                                          
8 Anderson, “Secession in International Law”, note 4. p.343  
9 G. Anderson, “Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession and the Criteria for Statehood in International Law” 
(2015) 41:1 Brook J Intl L 1 p. 4, nn 6–7 
10 Ibid. 
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thesis will utilize main principles and framework set out by the United Nations General 
Assembly Resolutions in conjunction with state practice. Regarding the interpretation of state 
practice, textual elaboration as part of opinio juris will be a supporting aspect for non-uniformity 
of state practice while assessing both at the same time.11 
In addition to international mechanisms and documents, this thesis will exploit other sources of 
law which, however, are not internationally binding, but yet must be considered in legal practice. 
As main examples of this sources, it’s worth to mention reports and studies by international 
organizations or NGOs. These sources, though secondary, but yet provide with “soft law” which 
is a strong tool in complicated situations which require more flexibility from the law, especially, 
when the case is related to controversial human rights abuses. The work will overlap with such 
fields of international law as the territorial integrity, use of force by states and the right to self-
determination all regarded as interrelated aspects of one phenomenon as secession.  
 
Keywords: International Law, Human Rights, Border Violation, Occupied Territories, Self-
Governing Territories, State Sovereignty, National Self-Determination, Recognition 
(International Law) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
11 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America), 
Judgment, [1986] ICJ Rep 14 para 188-89, 191, 205 
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Chapter 1: The Right to Secession 
 
This chapter will provide for the right to self-determination in general, its brief history and most 
importantly, link it with the right to UNC Secession, while considering the principle of self-
determination as an integral and fundamental part of the right to secession. The objective of this 
chapter is to determine all the main circumstances and conditions necessary to trigger the right to 
UNC. 
Additionally, the section will analyse the relation between the principle of self-determination and 
the concept of statehood, in other words, the process of self-determination through withdrawal of 
territory. 
1.1 Self-Determination 
 
During World War 2, in 1941 the US and UK proclaimed self-determination as one of the 
objectives to be attained and put into practice at the end of the Conflict. The Atlantic Charter 
drafted by President F.D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill proclaimed self-determination as a 
general standard governing territorial change, as well as a principle concerning the free choice of 
rules in every sovereign state, which was later defined as internal self-determination. However, 
while discussing and drafting the core mechanism of self-determination, some issues came out 
such as cited from the UNCIO: it "would open the door to inadmissible interventions if, as seems 
probable, one wishes to take inspiration from the people's right to self-determination in the action 
of the organization and not in the relations between the peoples".12 Moreover, the principle may 
be misused or taken as a justifying point for certain politicians, for example by Hitler, to justify 
military invasions and annexations.  
Therefore, Committee responsible for the drafting of the relevant provision agreed on 
four points:  
                                                          
12 UNCIO vol. VI 300 
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1) The principle corresponded closely to the will and desires of peoples everywhere and should 
be clearly enunciated in the UN Charter13 
2) The principle conformed to the purposes of the Charter only insofar as it implied the right of 
self-determination of peoples and not the right of secession14 
3) The principle "as one whole extends as a general basic conception to a possible amalgamation 
of nationalities if they so freely choose"15  
4) An essential element of the principle is free and genuine expression of the will16 
The origin of the article on self-determination may be found in 1966 International 
Covenants on Human Rights. As one of the main and basic provisions may be stressed the article 
1(2) of the UN Charter. Furthermore, numerous links to self-determination may be found 
throughout the entire Charter. Article 76 of UN Charter states that self-determination means self-
government and has nothing to do with independence of peoples.17 Moreover, the charter didn 
not define self-determination precisely, nor distinguished between external and internal types.  
Since self-determination has deep roots in the concept of the equal rights of peoples, equality of 
races, friendly relation among states, it required more comprehensive documents in order to 
regulate such a vast area of influence and interdependence.  
Finally, the article on self-determination was adopted in 1955.18 Article 1(3) also grants 
peoples of dependent territories (non-self-governing and trust territories) the rights freely to 
decide their international status, in other words, whether to form a state or to associate with an 
existing sovereign State.19 As has been recognized in art. 23 para. 3 of the UDHR, the will of the 
                                                          
13 UNCIO vol VI 296 
14 UNCIO vol. VI 298 
15UNCIO vol. VI 704 
16 UNCIO vol VI 455 
17  United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, e.i.f. 24.10.1945, 1 UNTS XVI art. 76 
18 UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, e.i.f 16.12.1966, United 
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171 Art. 1: All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue 
of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development 
19 Ibid., Art. 1 para. 3 
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people should be the basis of the authority of government.20 In addition, article 27 of ICCPR 
includes rights of minorities, however, the enumerated rights only refer to cultural, religious and 
linguistic freedoms, that is the right need to guarantee that a minority is able to maintain its 
identity. 
While speaking of self-determination, the major importance must be attributed to its 
types, such as external and internal. If the first one regulates rights of peoples as a whole state 
and concerns mainly colonial peoples, the internal type, according to W.Wilson21, may be 
defined as the will of peoples to the "right to authentic self-government, the right for people 
really and freely to choose its own political and economic regime".22 However, the main 
question may be posed as – Is there some kind of instrument which provides right for a certain 
part of population of sovereign State? In order to answer this question, we must make a more 
detailed analyse of mechanism of self-determination.  
First, speaking of colonial people, it may be underlined that their legal position was 
discussed in 1971 by ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on Namibia, when the court held that: the 
subsequent development of international law in regard to non-self-governing territories, as 
enshrined in the Charter of the UN, made the principle of self-determination applicable to all of 
them.23 Next, while trying to understand the structure of internal self-determination, it's 
important to define its main characteristics. As a main definition, it is fair enough to state that the 
internal type emphasizes mainly the right of peoples to expression through a representative in a 
democratic government; protecting the rights of religious minorities and racial groups who are 
under discrimination by the State they live in; the rights of ethnic groups, linguistic minorities, 
indigenous populations, and national peoples living in federated States.24 
                                                          
20 General Assembly, 5th session : 3rd Committee, 310th Meeting Report, UN Doc. A/C 3/SR:310 1950 
para. 14 
21 Thomas Woodrow Wilson (December 28, 1856 – February 3, 1924) was an American statesman and 
academic. 28th American president 
22 Cassese, A. Self-Determination of peoples: a Legal Reappraisal — Cambridge University Press 1995 
p.101  
23 Legal Consequences for States of The Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (SOUTH WEST 
AFRICA) Notwithstanding SCR 276 (1970) ICJ, Reports 1971, 31(para.52) 
24 A.Cassese, note 22, p.102 
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Thus, it is obvious that the principle of self-determination is applicable not only to 
colonial peoples but all peoples. Generally, fundamental importance is attributed to the right of 
self-determination. Human Rights Committee in its comment to article 1 stated that in order to 
support and realize all the fundamental human rights it is vital to guarantee proper 
implementation of the right to self-determination.25 
In order to demonstrate the main structure of internal self-determination, we must break it 
down in several aspects 
A) People have a right to choose and form State's policy and political system, in other words, 
people have constitutive powers, however this right may be derogated in case when people 
choose to have a dictatorship 
B) People have a right to take part in constitutional changes and decide which constitutional 
norm is better for them. People also can express their protests against dictatorship and tyranny. 
C) People have a right to be a part of government, lead public affairs, participate in referendums, 
elections and other public events. 
Therefore, the right to self-determination clearly provides for the set of obligations for states and 
benefits for peoples inhabiting it.  
Since the principle of self-determination has an evolutionary nature it is sometimes 
perplexing to trace the real violation and distinguish it from illusionary demands of groups of 
peoples. Nevertheless, it is important to list the main types of violation of self-determination.  
First of all, the most classical form of violation is the military occupation during which an 
independent country is occupied by another power. Second type concerns mainly internal 
conflicts, when with the background of foreign intervention, political parties in a conflict, which 
means the State can't find any peaceful measures of dispute resolution. For example, Afghanistan 
and Kampuchea. In this case it's more complicated to stop the violence because there are two 
influencing aspects. Third is when the soil and population are under the authority of another 
State, with no military occupation or civil strife. However, the power is exercised illegally, as an 
example may serve Namibia. In this case the will and actions of the people play the crucial role. 
                                                          
25 UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), CCPR General Comment No. 12: Article 1 (Right to Self-
determination), The Right to Self-determination of Peoples, 13 March 1984 
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They must form their own institutions, rules and international status, according to international 
law.  
The last but the most complicated and the most important for this paper is when an independent 
nation with its own sovereign state is occupied by another power, however the form of 
occupation (quasi-occupation) is not unlawful from the perspective of international law, 
specifically the prohibition of use of armed force.  People has no right historically to choose 
internal institutions and to elect rulers, nor has it been in a position to decide upon its 
international status. As a unique example, in the second part of this paper we will analyse the 
Palestine case. (Complicated political and military problems, no external and internal self-
determination, no provision referred in the 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations)17 
1.2 Legal Analysis of Secession 
 
In this part the author will discuss the right to secession as a legal phenomenon, analyse it under 
colonial and non-colonial contexts and provide for possible legal grounds. The main purpose of 
this part is to establish a certain picture of secession and possible conditions when it may be 
triggered.  
While speaking of secession as from the view of state practice it can be split in two types: 
consensual and unilateral.26 Consensual secession is the type of secession which is based on legal 
mechanisms provided by the State, while unilateral secession is the process which may include 
use of force and other necessary means.27 It is possible to break down the consensual type into 
constitutional and politically-negotiated. Conversely, constitutional secession, yet rare, supposes 
a provision in constitution of a sovereign State which provides for proper act of secession from 
the metropolitan state. Example of provision providing for constitutional secession may be found 
in the 1921 Liechtenstein Constitution, in particular art. 4(2) which provides for secession of 
groups of individuals from the state territory.28 
                                                          
26 G.Anderson, note 4, p. 350 
27 Ibid. 
28 Art 4 1. Changes in the boundaries of the territory of the State may only be made by a law. Boundary 
changes between communes and the union of existing ones also require a majority decision of the citizens 
residing there who are entitled to vote. 
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Diplomatic negotiations form the basis of politically-negotiated type of secession. The main 
requirement of this type of secession is appropriate room and will for negotiations over disputed 
territories. Politically-negotiated type is applied when there is no constitutional regulation 
providing for secession, however secessionist states have quite friendly relationships and open 
for peaceful negotiations29 As one of the best examples it’s worth to mention the dissolution of 
Czechoslovakia in 1993. While two distinguished groups negotiated over territory eventually 
formed their own independent states as Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
Finally, the unilateral secession supposes the withdrawal without an actual consent by the State. 
Moreover, there are two known types of secession30 The colonial type is not very popular 
nowadays and refers to peoples who are (used to be) colonies of a metropolitan state. The UNC 
secession is more complicated since it includes unilateral withdrawal of a territory from a 
sovereign State. As following from the above-mentioned consensual types of secession, 
unilateral secession takes place when there is complete lack of constitutional support or grounds 
for political negotiations. The author here also addresses the main legal collision with the 
principle of territorial integrity, which makes the unilateral secession a highly controversial 
topic.  
While secession for colonies is a remedy for ending the colonial regime and taking back their 
independence, its existence outside the colonial context is somewhat complicated. There are two 
theories that support the right to remedial secession: the primary right and the remedial right. 
Thomas Simon explains in the following manner: “Under the remedial view, secession is 
justified only as a remedy of last resort for persistent and serious injustices. Primary right 
theorists, in contrast, argue that a right to secession does not depend upon a finding of injustices. 
They claim either that a right to secede can be made on ascriptive grounds, such as the 
nationality of the peoples claiming the right; on democratic, plebiscitary bases that reflect the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
2. Individual communes have the right to secede from the State. A decision to initiate the secession 
procedure shall be taken by a majority of the citizens residing there who are entitled to vote. Secession 
shall be regulated by a law or, as the case may be, a treaty. In the latter event, a second ballot shall be held 
in the commune after the negotiations have been completed. 
29 G.Anderson, note 4, p. 351.  
30 Ibid. at 353-4 
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preferences of peoples living within a territory; or on administrative grounds that simply assess 
the capability to function as an independent state”31 
The author argues here that the existence of primary right to secession may be somewhat 
dangerous for territorial integrity of any state, since it presupposes liberty of any group and their 
right to “grab” the territory and thus secede regardless their right to internal self-determination. 
While other secessionist movements were titled as remedial secession and always pointed at 
certain violations of internal self-determination and resulted in external self-determination of 
oppressed peoples.32 
All in all, regardless the fact that secession is a subject to many opposing theories, yet it is 
impossible to deny its de facto existence. Another question is whether it should be based on the 
right to self-determination or no. Two following parts will present two opposing theories, where 
the first postulates for a direct link between the right to self-determination and secession and 
provide for the existence of the right to secession, while the second part denies any relations 
between self-determination and secession, however doesn’t deny the right to secession.   
1.2.1 The Right to Secession and Self-Determination  
 
While discussing the principle of self-determination, many scholars evoke debates over this 
principle as a part of creation of state. One of the key problems triggering these debates is 
relation of the principle to politics, as Crowford stated: “[s]elf-determination as a legal right or 
principle threatened to bring about significant changes in the political geography of the world, 
not limited to the dismemberment of Empires.”33 Therefore, it is crucial for this thesis to 
determine, whether recognition and statehood may be initiated through self-determination and if 
yes, then in which cases.  
                                                          
31 T.Simon, Remedial Secession: What the Law Should Have Done, from Katanga to Kosovo 40:1 GA J 
Intl & Comp L 105 2011 p. 143 
32 From the perspective of primary right supporters, the process of secession must be regarded as a result 
of human nature and freedoms given by international instruments. However, in case of denial of primary 
right to secession, peoples have no choice but to turn to the remedial secession, thus remedial type is a 
natural consequence of harsh violations of positive obligations of states. Eventually, one may assume that 
the remedial secession is one of modern forms of existence of natural law. 
33 See more: J.Crawford, note 3 
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As of 2016, there were more than 60 ongoing conflicts over national self-determination in the 
world.34 What’s more, since 1990 they caused around 20 million deaths all around the world.35 
As mentioned in this work, the principle of self-determination is regarded as a fundamental 
principle of international law. However, the main international instruments do not specify 
whether this principle may be used as a ground for the UNC Secession. The issue related to the 
objective of this thesis questions the neutrality of the right by asking which peoples may exercise 
their right to UNC Secession outside the scope of colonialism.  
According to Anderson,  
“...Unlike many other human rights, self-determination is applicable to groups, or 
"peoples" (defined as a nationally-based substate group) that are empowered to "freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development."  
This means that should a people within an existing state be systematically and egregiously 
denied this right, then the prospect of UNC secession will become available. Thus, should a 
people within an existing state be denied their right to internal self-determination, then a right to 
external self-determination, or UNC secession, will arise.”36 Here the internal and external rights 
to self-determination are linked together forming a certain hierarchy. From this statement one 
may come to a conclusion that Anderson and other scholars who postulate for self-determination 
as a ground for secession, give preference to certain principles of international law over other. 
Thus, in our case, the interdependence is between self-determination and principle of territorial 
integrity, which means that violation of one customary international law leads to limitation of 
other. Is it possible in horizontal legal system of international law? As we see from state practice, 
sometimes it is possible.37 
                                                          
34 “United States Policy Toward National Self-Determination Movements” online: 
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA14/20160315/104672/HHRG-114-FA14-Wstate-VejvodaI-
20160315.pdf 
35 Ibid. 
36 G.Anderson, note 9, p. 8 
37 Here the author means almost every case of unilateral non-colonial secession. Speaking of customary 
international law, in this case we have a collision of two rules of the same value, however, when we speak 
of violation of the right to self-determination, we usually refer to oppression of peoples, which, as will be 
argued in following parts, may be of more importance than territorial integrity. 
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However, it doesn’t mean that the right to UNC Secession is absolute and is applicable to every 
single group more or less falling under the scope of any provision related to self-determination. 
The controversy is that certain preconditions must occur to trigger the right. In order to become 
an international custom, it’s required to fulfil two conditions a) to be a part of state-practice; b) 
opinio juris. If we put the UNC Secession in this context, it’s worth to note that “…mere textual 
articulation of a qualified right to UNC secession in declaratory General Assembly resolutions, 
without other concomitant state practice, such as grants of recognition in response to UNC 
secessionist disputes, will not constitute a binding rule of customary international law. This is 
because the requisite element of opinio juris will not have been satisfied”38 Therefore, it is vital 
for the thesis to establish a certain legal basis for the right to UNC Secession. 
This is also mentioned by Oscar Schachter  
“…in place of a practice that began with the gradual accretion of acts and subsequently 
received the imprimatur of opinio juris, the Court reversed the process: an opinio juris 
expressed first as a declaration would become law if confirmed by general practice 
[instead of consistent practice]…"39 
This may be supported by the statement of Tullio Treves: 
“…the practice relevant for establishing the existence of a customary international rule must 
neither necessarily include all States, nor must it be completely uniform. Whatever oppositions of 
behavior and of opinion there may have been in the formative stage of the rule, the existence at a 
given time of the rule requires that the generality of States consider the rule as binding”40 
Moreover, despite the fact that it is necessary to take into account mainly general state practice, it 
is possible to also consider as a part of custom such sources as travaux preparatoires, diplomatic 
correspondence, policy statements, the opinions of government legal advisers etc.41 Most 
                                                          
38 Ibid. 
39 O.Schachter, New Custom: Power, Opinio Juris and Contrary Practice, in Jerzy Makarczyk, ed, Theory 
of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century, The Hague:  Kluwer Law International, 1996 p. 
531-2 
40 T.Treves, ed, Customary International Law — Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law 
(Oxford University Press) para 35 
41 J.Crawford, note 3, p. 24. 
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certainly, beforementioned sources are accepted as customary practice in cases when there is 
uncertainty or vagueness in interpretation of main UN instruments.42 
Taking this all into account, it is possible to establish whether there is an official right to UNC 
Secession in cases of in extremis human rights violations. While applying above-mentioned 
theory of customary international law as using the state practice and opinio juris, the author may 
now proceed to establishing the legal source of UNC Secession.  The most consistent instrument 
which is providing for the UNC Secession is the Principle 5, 43  While analyzing, it is crucial to 
note that those states which are not implementing their positive obligations to provide for equal 
rights and the right to self-determination, lose proposed protection of territorial integrity. The 
paragraph 7 states that territorial integrity must not be endangered in those cases when 
"independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and 
self-determination of people“44  Therefore, the principle of territorial integrity is respected in 
those cases when the State creates all necessary conditions for internal self-determination of all 
peoples living on its territory.45 
Thus, it can be deemed that the Friendly Relations Declaration bestowing enough power on the 
principle of self-determination to be prioritized over the state-sovereignty and territorial integrity 
principles in cases of harsh human rights violations. In other words, according to Declaration, 
violation of right to internal self-determination invokes the right to external self-determination, 
therefore making clear distinction between these two types and underlining their interdependence 
                                                          
42 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331(e.I.f.27 January 
1980) arts 61, 31 (1), 32 (a) 
43 Notably, the paragraph 7 which says ”Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as 
authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the 
territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in 
compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and 
thus possessed of a government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without 
distinction as to race, creed or colour.”UN General Assembly, Declaration on Principles of International 
Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, 24 October 1970, A/RES/2625(XXV)  
44 Ibid. 
45 See: Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, GA Res 
50/6, UNGAOR, 56th Sess, Un Doc A/Res/50/6 1995 art 1 
18 
 
at the same time.46 However, authorization of secession by the Friendly Relation Declaration 
does not mean that the right exists for every case of violation of internal self-determination. 
Violations and denial of fundamental rights must be systematical and touch upon religious or 
national aspects of minorities. Eventually, it follows that the Friendly Relations Declaration 
provides for the right to UNC Secession in case of certain preconditions as in extremis human 
rights violations are present. Another crucial case which forms a fundamental precedent for the 
right to UNC Secession is the Kosovo Advisory Opinion by the ICJ.47 The opinion clearly 
defines the obligation to respect the right to self-determination and also establishes the 
consequences of its negligence.  According to Judge Abdulqawi Yusuf, an ethnically or racially 
distinct group of people which is constantly denied internal self-determination may claim the 
right to external self-determination which in its turn may lead to separation from the State.48 The 
case of Kosovo will be analyzed in the second part of this thesis, however, for now it worth to 
mention that the case along with the judgement was invoked several times throughout state 
practice regarding secession.49 
Additionally, Judge Cançado Trindade stated that:  
...Recent developments in contemporary international law were to disclose both the 
external and internal dimensions of the right of self-determination of peoples: the former 
meant the right of every people to be free from any form of foreign domination, and the 
latter referred to the right of every people to choose their destiny in accordance with 
their own will, if necessary — in case of systematic oppression and subjugation — 
                                                          
46 See more: G.Anderson, A Post-Millennial Inquiry into the United Nations Law of Self-Determination: 
A Right to Unilateral Non-Colonial Secession?, Vanderbelt Journal of Transnational Law Volume 
49; 4  2016, p. 1221 
47 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion), General List No. 141, International Court of Justice (ICJ), 22 
July 2010 
48 Ibid, Justice Yusuf, separate opinion 
49 In case of South Ossetia and Abkhazia which claimed independence under Russian support, the latter 
party brought the example of Kosovo as the main argument, though Russia still doesn’t recognize Kosovo 
as an independent state. Moreover, in 2014, Crimea followed the same scenario of Kosovo, backed by 
Russia. Russian critics on unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo may be found in: Accordance 
with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of lndependence by the Provisional Institutions of 
Self-Government of Kosovo (Request for advisory opinion) WRITTEN STATEMENT BY THE RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION 19.04.2009 para. 73; 75 Available at https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-
related/141/15628.pdf 
19 
 
against their own government. This distinction challenges the purely inter-State 
paradigm of classic international law. In the current evolution of international law, 
international practice (of States and of international organizations) provides support for 
the exercise of self-determination by peoples under permanent adversity or systematic 
repression, beyond the traditional confines of the historical process of decolonization. 
Contemporary international law is no longer insensitive to patterns of systematic 
oppression and subjugation. 50 
 
The above-mentioned opinion defines the whole concept of possible existence of the right to 
UNC secession. However, as was mentioned above, there may be some discrepancies in UN 
Documents and other secondary texts and the main reason lies in the drafting process of those 
documents. The point is that while drafting, the main core of the Declaration was split between 
those states that supported the right to UNC Secession and those who opposed it. For example, 
the former communist States supported the idea of UNC Secession as a result of their policy 
aimed towards self-determination, while Western and African States opposed them, stating that 
there is no such right as UNC Secession. Finally, the compromise was suggested by the group 
from Netherlands, who proposed to accept the right to UNC Secession in cases of violation of 
fundamental human rights. Thus, Paragraph 7 was created, which, however, does not directly 
mention the UNC Secession, however, presupposes it.51 
Therefore, the reference for a possible right to secession. Mere examples are: The Resolution on 
the Definition of Aggression,52 Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International 
Disputes53, Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining 
                                                          
50 Ibid. at para 184, Justice Trindade, separate opinion 
51 For example, Vidmar states that ”…the relevant judicial decisions and academic writings do not 
provide sufficient evidence to suggest that in international legal doctrine, remedial secession is a 
universally-accepted entitlement of oppressed peoples. But…the idea underlying remedial secession—the 
last resort for ending the oppression of a certain people— can still influence the recognition policies of 
states” 
52 Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, GA Res 3314 (XXIX), UNGAOR, 29th Sess, UN Doc 
A/Res/29/3314 (1974) art 7 (3) 
53 Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes Between States, GA Res 
37/10, UNGAOR, UN Doc A/Res/37/10 (1982) Art 2 (6) 
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from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations,54 Declaration on the Prevention and 
Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten International Peace and Security and 
on the Role of the United Nations in this Field55 and the Fiftieth Anniversary Declaration.56 
All in all, the above-mentioned documents provide for cases of human rights violations which 
are in moderato and in extremis.57 According to Christopher Borgen, those scholars who claim 
for existence of the right to UNC Secession must also take into account certain number of 
conditions, such as: the secessionist group may be regarded as “peoples” (international 
recognition), there must take place serious violations of human rights within the State 
responsible for protection of those peoples, and finally, there are no efficient remedies under 
domestic or international law, in other words, exhaustion of other remedies which would invoke 
the “last remedy as remedial secession”58 
The thesis is analysing such cases which form a precedent and many of those demonstrate the 
qualified right to a UNC Secession in cases of human rights violations (in extremis) and 
eventually find support under international law. Among “successful” cases, the author lists East 
Timor, Bangladesh, Kosovo and Eritrea as examples.59 All aforementioned cases have one set of 
events in common. The right to a UNC Secession was triggered as a result of in extremis human 
rights violations as opposed to in moderato, in conjunction with constant unreasonable denial of 
self-determination. Consequently, these cases provide a basis for existence of right to a UNC 
Secession, however, as an ultimum remedium.  
 
 
                                                          
54 Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle of Refraining from the Threat or 
Use of Force in International Relations, GA Res 42/22, UNGAOR, UN Doc A/Res/42/22 (1987) art 3 (3) 
[Declaration on the Threat or Use of Force]. 
55 Declaration on the Prevention and Removal of Disputes and Situations Which May Threaten 
International Peace and Security and on the Role of the United Nations in this Field General Assembly 
resolution 43/51, GA Res 43/51, UNGAOR, UN Doc A/Res/43/51 (1988) art 3 (3) 
56 Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, GA Res 50/6, 
UNGAOR, 56th Sess, Un Doc A/Res/50/6 (1995) art 1. 
57 In moderato – political oppression. In extremis – forced exile, migration, genocide and ethnic cleansing. 
58 C.J Borgen, Is Kosovo a Precedent? Secession, Self-Determination and Conflict Resolution, (2008) 47 
Int’l Leg Materials 46 p. 4 
59 G.Anderson, note 9, p. 11 
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1.2.2 When is The Remedy Needed? Secession of Quebec 
 
Since there is no direct and complete instruction of secession and possible situation when the 
remedy exactly needed, it is quite difficult to establish the correct “workflow” and “time” of 
secession under international law. While one of the aims of this work is to determine the 
potential optimal threshold for secession, the author finds it necessary to analyse different 
interpretations of “remedial situation” raised throughout the history of international law.  
As an example of uncertainty in this case the author will take several statements by the Supreme 
Court of Canada over the Quebec case.60 Thus, the court noted that the whole concept of internal 
self-determination is specifically designed for full representation of peoples in every crucial 
aspect of political, social and economic life, while the right to external self-determination outside 
of colonial context “arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully 
defined circumstances”61 Here, the researcher would like to take out “the most extreme cases” 
and try to apply this statement to available sources of international law. While analysis of all 
non-derogable general human rights is outside of the scope of this work, it is still necessary to 
understand what forms those extreme cases. While in this work, the as one of the main legal 
sources postulating for the right to secession the author took the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law, the only conclusion that comes to one’s mind is that the state which doesn’t 
comply with the above-analysed provisions of the Declaration (the reference goes to the 
obligation of the state to provide for equal rights of all peoples living on the sovereign territory). 
Therefore, the author assumes that the “extreme case” mentioned by the court might be the one 
when peoples don’t have one of those rights mentioned in the Declaration. Moreover, the Court 
also stated in case of inability to exercise the right to internal self-determination, “it [people] is 
entitled, as a last resort, to exercise it by secession. “62  
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Despite the fact that the court referred to the right to UNC secession, it was still outside of the 
scope of the case, therefore, it remained unclear when and how peoples can implement that right. 
Another case mentioning those extreme conditions (just a term) happened over Aaland Islands. 
There, the Second Commission of Rapporteurs spoke about remedy and last resort as an 
“exceptional solution”63  
Either way, there is no specific reference to when and how the remedy must be used, nor it is 
specified how high must be the scale of violations in order to refer to this remedy. The author 
may conclude that regardless this constantly emphasized link between the right to self-
determination and secession, it is still highly doubtful whether such a connotation must be used 
to violate sovereignty of international borders. Nevertheless, both state and legal practice shows 
that there is definitely a connection between the right to self-determination and secession. In 
following, the author will demonstrate the opposing opinion and try to break the link between 
self-determination and the right to secession.  
 
1.3 Internal Self-determination does not lead to Secession  
 
While the previous section analysed the right to self-determination in relation to the right to 
secession, more certainly, the right to a UNC Secession, this section will demonstrate an 
opposing view, which states that the right to self-determination does not provide the grounds for 
the right to secession.64  
Throughout many historical examples, the majority of secessionist cases were followed by 
violence and use of force, thus blaming it on self-determination.65 It seems that a strong nexus 
between self-determination and secession is undeniable. In other words, self-determination, 
regarded as the “normative principle of nationalism” presupposes the attribution of sovereign 
                                                          
63 Report of the International Committee of Jurists Entrusted by the Council of the League of Nations with 
the Task of Giving an Advisory Opinion upon the Legal Aspects of the Aaland Islands Question, League 
of Nations O.J., Spec. Supp. No. 3,p.21 (1920) 
64 Z.A. Velasco, Self-Determination and Secession: Human Rights-Based Conflict Resolution, 16 Int'l 
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territory/State as the apex point of national independence.66 While analyzing the UN Charter and 
other relevant instruments, some scholars deem that the wording to “.. freely determine their 
political status..” invokes the assumption that in cases of lack of political independence and 
political will of minorities expressed in the State, secession must be used, if necessary, for 
achieving political independence.67 Eventually, while analyzing the post-colonial history of the 
world, numerous ethnical and national entities claimed to secede relying on the principle of self-
determination.68 Moreover, during the period of Cold War, the rise of secessionist-based 
movements involving armed conflicts presented a great menace for the basic principle of 
territorial integrity of states.69 Mere examples of those movements are Kurds in Turkey, Kashmir 
case in India, South Sudan and its non-Muslims part of population.70 
The statement that self-determination does not lead to secession is supported by two lines of 
analysis: the first one is the internal doctrinal coherence, and the second is the external 
application as a legal principle,71 therefore, underlying the doctrinal gap between self-
determination and secession.72 The main opposing work example states that the right of ethnical 
or national entities to secede comes not from the doctrine of self-determination but is based on 
“effective power or authority in international politics.” The process of secession through self-
determination is highly complicated and contradictory. Since self-determination is regarded as 
“normative principle of nationalism” it eventually turns into a “legal anomaly”.  
Since there is no certain definition of those “peoples” who fall under the scope of self-
determination.73 Wilsonian interpretation of this principle lead to liberation of peoples, while 
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Hitler’s view on the right was completely different.74 It follows that if one takes the conflicts 
from Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Northern Ireland, Israel and Palestine, it becomes ridiculously 
obvious that all parties to the conflict claim the same right to self-determination.75 Every conflict 
supposed self-determination of one side and violation of right to self-determination of another, 
therefore leading to its self-exclusion.76 
Speaking of peace and security, self-determination, while being one of the basic principles 
preserving maintenance of stability and peace, stands out as a reason of more evolving conflicts 
at the same time. In other words, as long as self-determination provides for secessionist 
inspiration, it will cause more conflicts. The opposing opinion provides a strong but obvious 
point that self-determination and secession “challenge international norms and they aim to 
change international borders.”77 Thus, while secession presupposes international recognition of 
newly created states78 the issue concerns the entire international community.79 Recognition of 
statehood, as demonstrated throughout the history, is mainly the result of political judgment. 
Therefore, self-determination, as a legal basis for secession is based on political decisions of big 
powers.80 
It is also important to analyze the status of territories in post-war periods. The main constitution 
of Allies in First World War was the self-determination for peoples and their right to freely 
choose their future.81 However, the end of war demonstrated completely different state of affairs, 
which defined self-determination as a political instrument.82 Thus, the principle was used to 
break up some territories and neglected in those cases, where territories were to be kept. The 
mere example is Alsace-Lorraine region, which was given to Poland and Czhechoslovakia, while 
its population had no choice, but to obey. Austrian-Hungarian peace treaty supposed the transfer 
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of South Tyro to Italy without any public votes.83 Finally, Baltic States, as well as Caucasian 
Republics forgot about independence for the upcoming decades.84 
 
1.3.1 Post-Colonialism 
 
More cases of implementation of self-determination may be found in post-colonial period, when 
the nations were supposed to provide all grounds for proper self-determination of all former 
colonies. However, the author will try to demonstrate all discrepancies by analyzing some key 
cases. Speaking of colonial peoples and their right to self-government, it’s difficult to omit the 
participation of the UK in drafting process of the article of self-determination in the UN 
Charter.85 While the great power didn’t want to lose its external possessions, this episode 
demonstrates one more time that self-determination, even in its classical external sense is still a 
subject to political will, but not international custom and erga omnes obligation.  
To dig deeper into legal practice, the author analyzes the case of Western Sahara, where the right 
of one side which were Sarawahis was approved while Morocco and Mauritania were denied the 
right to territory. The ICJ held that there were "no legal ties... as might affect... the 
decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination 
through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory”86 
While in the case of East Timor, the ICJ stated that there is a right to self-determination for the 
people of East Timor, moreover, it has an erga omnes character. Nevertheless, procedural law 
appeared to be more competent than the erga omnes.87 “The Court, at the expense of 
contradicting itself, virtually gave no value to the East Timorese's right of self-determination 
when it dismissed the case because it would not rule on the lawfulness of Indonesia's patently 
illegal occupation of East Timor because Indonesia was not a party litigant”88 Consequently, the 
right to self-determination happened to be far from an erga omnes nature, since Indonesia was 
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left out. Eventually, the agreement for a referendum was decided with the background of harsh 
human rights violations by Indonesia, which forced the international community to pay attention 
and step in, therefore triggering the 1999 referendum for independence.89 
Above-mentioned cases demonstrate once more that the right to self-determination plays highly 
minor role in disputes concerning territories, while the strong political will determines the final 
outcome of the cases.  
1.3.2 Non-Colonial Period 
 
While taking a closer look at cases related to “successful” non-colonial self-determination which 
had separation and territorial independence as a result, the author can bring such examples as 
Eritrea, Yugoslavia case, Bangladesh and South Sudan, as it has been mentioned in previous 
section. However, the opposing opinion of this section, unlike the previous one, states that 
aforementioned cases were a result of political will and power, but not self-determination as a 
result of independence.90 
Bangladesh’s case was successful due to Indian military intervention using the human rights 
violations against the Bengalis as a justification. In this case, "the disenfranchisement of the 
population as a result of interference with the electoral process, the brutality of the (Western) 
Pakistani forces and the fact that some 10 million refugees - a truly staggering number - 
consequently fled the country contributed to rapid recognition.”91 
In case of Eritrea, it has also different grounds for eventual independence. As a result of an 
alliance between the Eritrean Peoples’ Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Ethiopian Peoples’ 
Revolutionary Democratic Forces (EPRDF) which succeeded in the struggle against military 
junta (Derg) of Ethiopia. Later on, those groups came to a common decision to provide for a 
referendum (independence vote) for Eritreans.92 All in all, the independence was an exercise of 
common will of Eritrea and Ethiopia and not a UNC Secession.  
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The case of South Sudan represents the most recent expression of political will and as a result a 
secession on 9 July 2011. Everything began with the cancellation of autonomy of south by the 
government of Khartoum in 1983. This provoked the rise of secessionist movement by the Sudan 
people’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) and creation of its armed branch, the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA).93 Finally, the successful result was guaranteed by the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement between the SPLM and Sudanese Government under the supervision of Inter-
Governmental Authority n Development (IGAD) with its partner states, the US, the UK, Norway 
and Italy.  
While speaking of former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the secession of Slovenia 
and Croatia was mainly handled by German political power which had in its interest recognition 
of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991.94 Conversely, when the Croatian and Muslim population of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina claimed to secede for self-determination, Serbs were strictly of opposite 
opinion. Eventually, plebiscites were held by all involved national groups, to determine whether 
they want to remain a part of Yugoslavia, or secede based on their right of self-determination.95 
Thus, Bosnia-Herzegovina declared its independence on 3th March 1991, which later on was 
recognized by the US, the UN Security Council through a recommendation of the admission to 
the UN and finally its formal admission by the General Assembly on 22 may 1992.96 
All in all, to put in one sentence the whole point of opposing opinion, all aforementioned 
examples demonstrate a strong political power behind the principle of self-determination and its 
consequent secession. Final stage of implementation of secession based on self-determination is 
the state recognition by the international community. On the examples of Western Sahara and 
East Timor, the theory demonstrates that the claim for aforementioned rights does not necessarily 
mean its implementation and eventual independence. Therefore, existence and expression of the 
right to self-determination must not be confused with secession qua independence or statehood.97 
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If taken into account the doctrinal assumption that secession and self-determination are 
interdependent rights, self-determination would turn into a chaotic and highly uncertain right98 
due to its fundamental dependence on political will, and chaotic and unstable geopolitics. 
 
 
1.4 Final observations 
 
The opposing theory tries to establish a strict and determined propose of self-determination by 
stating that it is a basic human right which found its place in Article 21(3) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and currently is customary international law.99 Thus, one of 
interpretations 100 It is not an exclusive right, it does not postulate for the independence of 
minorities or other entities only, but for all peoples.  
Therefore, if we claim that the right to self-determination includes the right to secession, it would 
be necessary to draw a line of equality, as the cases of Palestine and Kosovo use self-
determination as a legal basis for their secessionist movements, so peoples in Syria, Tunisia, 
Egypt and many other countries where peoples are oppressed by governments must acquire their 
recognition through self-determination.101 
As self-determination is a fundamental human right, and if regarded from the perspective of 
human rights, the very right must be implemented in conjunction with the “human-rights-based 
approach to peace settlement and conflict resolution”.102 It doesn’t mean that the opposing theory 
completely excludes the possibility of secession in cases of harsh human rights violations against 
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ethnical entities, forced to exploit their “last resort”, human rights should provide a justification 
for separation, however the implementation and interpretation of the very right to secession must 
not be based on mere self-determination.103 
Thus, the theory concludes that self-determination and secession should not be associated with 
one another, otherwise the fundamental right to self-determination would become an “anomaly” 
which would provide an easy excuse for every entity willing to secede, eventually endangering 
another fundamental principle of territorial integrity. Additionally, while the author makes an 
attempt to take a look from the other side, it becomes obvious that secession in conjunction with 
self-determination for one people leads to violation of rights of another nation claiming their 
right to the same territory. Finally, self-determination qua secession exists as a dangerous 
combination which is often a reason for ethno-national conflicts and illegal use of force instead 
of peaceful dispute settlement.  
What’s regarding the implementation of self-determination, the opposing scholars claim that its 
effective implementation is possible only if followed by a strong political power and assistance 
from the international community. Therefore, all put together, self-determination must stand as a 
basic principle for human rights, but if one assumes that secession follows from the right to self-
determination, then it confronts itself as a human rights principle by creating all preconditions 
for aggression and violation. 
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Chapter 2: Secession Case by Case 
 
This chapter will discuss the mechanism of secession on case by case basis, including the 
comparative analysis of all integral parts of the process of secession. The author will take several 
recent and controversial cases of so called “contemporary secessionist practice” and brake them 
down into several main aspects which caused and lead to secession with its further outcomes.  
First of all, before analyzing every case one by one, it is necessary to outline the main criteria 
which are required by international law for statehood and creation of new states. The 
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States104 states certain criteria for the 
entities in order to be recognized as a state: "The State as a person of international law should 
possess the following qualifications: a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) 
government; and d) capacity to enter into relations with other states".105 However, not all of 
newly created stated followed all four criteria listed by the convention. As it will be 
demonstrated in case studies, a number of States met only first two criteria at the time of 
declaration of independence.106 
Another vital mechanism exploited in this analysis is the list of conditions stated by Dugard 
which are necessary for the secession to take place:107 
1) it is necessary to have a certain people with its own identity based on ethnicity, race, culture, 
language or religion; 
2) the people must be settled on a distinct territorial part of the State and have the majority of 
population of the area; 
3) the right of the people to take part in government must be denied, as well as the possibility of 
representation in political structures must be blocked or limited; 
4) there must be constant violation of fundamental human rights; 
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5) secession is possible only after exhaustion of all possible domestic means to protect their 
human rights and all above-mentioned rights; 
If first four conditions are simply representing the core basic human rights and somehow are 
connected to self-determination, the fifth condition raises a lot of questions and problems. The 
author thinks that the criteria stated by Dugard are quite logical and might be in accordance with 
some general provisions of international law. For example, denial of participation in 
governmental affairs and political life, violation of fundamental rights forms the part of general 
rights that are included in positive obligations of every state towards its peoples. However, as it 
will be shown further in this work, these are just theoretical statements, since real secessions 
happen in an independent self-developed scenario.  
Therefore, for the purpose of this thesis, it is necessary to answer a question as When the process 
of secession must be triggered after violations of first points listed above and can it be triggered 
at all based on international law or as a strong political will of great powers in violation of 
international law? Taking into account the last aspect, the thesis may question the legality of 
secessions gained through use of force by a third state as it may fall under non-recognition 
principle.108 
The analysis of cases listed below will demonstrate how in practice those mechanisms work and 
what is the real state of affairs regulated by international law.  
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2.1 Kosovo 
 
Before the author goes into analysis of legal aspects of the question, it is worth to mention a few 
facts about history. Population of Kosovo consists of 90 per cent Kosovo Albanians and 8 per 
cent Serbs.109 Kosovo was an autonomous province of Serbia which was removed in 1989 by 
Serbia without any conditions, moreover, it was accompanied with a number of discriminatory 
laws aimed to limit or prohibit the use of Albanian language in education.110 Therefore, Kosovo 
had to declare its independence in 1991.111 The declaration didn’t receive any recognition from 
the international community.  
At first, there were some non-armed separatists from Kosovo, however in 1996 their place was 
taken by a more violent and radical group named Kosovo Liberation Army, which in its turn 
launched vast attacks on Serbian military forces, consequently causing an armed conflict.112 In 
1999 followed NATO intervention. Afterwards, the Security Council adopted a Resolution 1244 
(1999) in which it overtook the governance in Kosovo by an international civilian and NATOs 
military intervention.113 In 2008 Kosovo unilaterally declared independence. Afterwards, Kosovo 
received widespread recognition from the international community which at the beginning was 
21 states including the USA, while among those who opposed were Serbia, Russia and China.114 
Here comes a question whether Kosovo could be recognized as a State without fulfilling all four 
criteria from the Montevideo Convention? Since Serbs still were in majority power in certain 
areas of Kosovo like Northern Kosovo, they were conducting votes and creating new municipal 
bodies with Serbs-led majority there.115 
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Therefore, while some recognizing states were supporting the action based on political facts and 
neglecting the legal side of the question, others, those who opposed the secession, were 
emphasizing the contradiction with basic principles of international law as territorial integrity.116 
As a result, Serbia asked for clarification from the International Court of Justice, the advisory 
opinion requested by the United Nations’ General Assembly for Serbia was intended to find 
answers on legality of secession.117 Eventually, the court declared that the declaration for 
independence "did not violate any applicable rule of international law”.118 Obviously, the ICJ 
gave the initiative to political power and internal civil conflict to determine the actual outcome 
and faith of Kosovo.119 
2.1.1 Historical Background 
 
The confrontation between Kosovo Albanians and Serbians may be traced even back to rule of 
Ottoman Empire. Kosovo Albanians were seeking for autonomy, independence or even 
unification with Albania. However, the first outbreak of oppression took place in 1948, when 
Albania decided to preserve its pro-soviet policy.120 As a result, Kosovo Albanians underwent 
severe oppression from Yugoslav authorities, therefore besides physical violence against Kosovo 
Albanians there were limitations in public life. For example, 68% of public service positions was 
given to Serbs and Montenegrins, who formed only 27.5% of entire population of Kosovo.121 It 
is worth to mention that the constitution of SFRY of 1963 directly denied any republican 
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autonomy for areas of “distinct national composition”.122 Moreover, it stated that Kosovo and 
Vojvodina regarded as autonomous provinces, however only within Republic of Serbia.123 
The first official call for separation as a Republic of Kosovo within the SFRY was in 1968, 
followed by such improvements as utilization of Albanian symbolic, language on even bilingual 
education in University of Pristina.124 Taking the version of Constitution of the SFRY of 1974, 
the SFRY contained six republics and two autonomous provinces within the Republic of Serbia, 
which were Kosovo and Vojvodina.125  In fact, the constitution had a very detailed approach to 
internal self-determination. While distinguishing even between “nations” and “nationalities, 
where the former referred to peoples of republics and the latter concerned nationalities of 
autonomous provinces.126 Federal units had a very wide range of powers and competences over 
their territories and autonomous provinces had their representatives on federal level.127 
Nevertheless, the crucial fact is that the Constitution attributed the right of self-determination 
only to nations (republics) which even accepted secession.128 However, Kosovo Albanians were 
not happy with wide but yet limiting autonomy. The main demand was to create a separate 
republic of Kosovo.129 In the end, when in 80s Slobodan Milosevic was coming to power in 
Serbia, autonomy of Kosovo was questioned and reconsidered by nationalist leaders.130 Here the 
author briefly demonstrated relations of Kosovo Albanians with Serb authorities and their 
position in FRY. As it is seen, Kosovars had secessionist movements for more than half of a 
century. Despite the fact, that they were given a wide recognition and their rights were protected 
on constitutional level, the consequence of ethnical conflicts in past had always been present as 
rejection of Serbian authorities. In following, the author will illustrate the state of affairs after 
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suspension of autonomy of Kosovo and aggravation of situation, which in its turn led to what we 
had in 2008. 
While the status and rights of Kosovo were clearly established by constitution, it was an 
autonomous region of Serbia and possessed some powers, so it was not easy for Serbia to 
interfere in Kosovo’s affairs. Therefore, Serbian authorities prepared to enact amendments in 
constitution in 1989 which would bring certain limitations in Kosovo’s autonomy and powers. 
As a result, Serbian authorities obtained the most of competences over Kosovo, while the latter 
lost a big part of its possibilities of government.131 Later on, as a result of vote of 28th March of 
1989, due to direct amendments in constitution, which were enacted with the presence of police 
forces and Serbian politicians132 Kosovo lost its autonomy. In other words, all institutions 
created for Kosovo’s autonomy now were under direct control of Serbia.133 Kosovo Albanians 
responded in a radical way, while on 2nd of July in 1989 the majority of Albanian members of 
Kosovo’s Assembly adopted a resolution which directly declared Kosovo an independent 
republic within Yugoslavia.134 
When the SFRY faced the process of dissolution in 1991, the Kosovo Albanians changed their 
political agenda and now were fighting for complete independence. However, while Serbia and 
Montenegro were to establish the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, there were no discussions 
concerning the status of Kosovo as a separate state. Thus, as it is obvious from the Constitution 
of the Federal republic of Yugoslavia, Kosovo remained a part of Serbia.135 Therefore, in 1991 
the so-called underground referendum was held by Kosovo Albanian politicians where was 
accepted the Resolution on Independence and Sovereignty of Kosovo, which was voted in favor 
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by 99.87%.136 However, eventually the declared independence of 19 October 1991 was 
recognized only by Albania.137  
Here the author would like to make a special emphasis on important violations of basic human 
rights which took place after these events. These facts will be taken as a measure for further 
comparative analysis and conclusions of this thesis. According to the Law on the Restriction of 
Real Property Transaction138 ethnic Albanians didn’t have an access to the market of private 
property, in other words, they couldn’t possess any property. Moreover, many Serbian refugees 
from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were replaced to Kosovo, which also aggravated the 
position of ethnic Albanians. This all finishing by limitations in health care for Albanians.139 
Here the author would like to point out the open violation of economic and social rights of a 
certain ethnic group within a state where they form a big minority. Later the researcher will get 
back to this fact, however now, it is important to mention the final triggers which led to NATO 
intervention in 1999.  
All in all, the situation in Kosovo at the time may be reported as quite hostile against Kosovo 
Albanians in the period from 1990 to 1999. Since every aspect of Kosovo’s public life had been 
controlled by Serbs, Albanians were highly oppressed. While Serbs implemented all possible 
administrative and political measures in order to haunt and control all protesting Albanians, it 
resulted in a big number of Albanians who had no access to employment, medical care etc. As a 
result, the death rates among Albanian population raised for a few times. Teachers and other 
social employees of Albanian distinct were dismissed, as well as the Albanian literature, history 
and any other related subject was largely forbidden or limited in schools. Therefore, the massive 
violations of human rights of Albanians by the mother-state could give a right to start protest and 
start using all possible means to settle the dispute, as it will be illustrated in further sections.  
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2.1.2 NATO, Intervention and the Accords of Ramboullet 
 
After 1995, followed y the emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and increased 
Serbian violations of human rights resulted in four resolutions by the UN.140 Three out of four 
resolutions addressed the situation In Kosovo condemning the violence from the FRY, proposed 
political and peaceful resolutions of conflict in Kosovo, however called the actions of Kosovars 
as “acts of terrorism).141 Moreover, those resolutions clearly confirm the right to territorial 
integrity of Serbia.142 In favour of Kosovo’s autonomy, the resolution 1160 mentions its right to 
autonomy and calls for the increased level of self-administration for Kosovo.143 These are the 
first steps of the UN to settle the conflict after its escalation with the dissolution of SFRY, 
however, the resolutions bear a non-binding nature and thus the negotiations are still to continue.  
One of the most remarkable dates in Kosovo-Serbian negotiations was at Rambouillet in France 
in 1999, where the main goal was to resolve the conflict in a peaceful way.144 On 23 February of 
1999 the Contact Groups of the United Kingdom, Russia, the United States, France and Italy 
drafted the Rambouillet Accords on Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in 
Kosovo.145  The main regulations of the Rambouillet Accords may be found in article 2, which 
provides for certain framework to put an end for hostilities in Kosovo.146 Moreover, the first 
article defines the mechanism of self-government for Kosovo, mentioning all legislative and 
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governmental bodies, such as “legislative, executive, judicial and other institutions established in 
accordance with this agreement”147 and according to the document, Serbian forces must be taken 
out from Kosovo.148  
The Rambouillet Accords presupposed the enforcement of human rights in the region and most 
importantly, all those articles mentioned above provided for pure internal self-determination for 
Kosovo Albanians. Provisions providing for self-government institutions, as well as protection a 
minority as well as clear references to Kosovo Albanians as a separate entity within Serbia 
illustrate how the mother state oppresses its minority. However, the Accords didn’t suppose any 
secessions and complete independence for Kosovo as there were clear references to territorial 
integrity of FRY. As a result, Kosovo was to become a powerful autonomous region with a wide 
range of powers, however, the agreement was refused by FRY and Serbia.149 As a consequence, 
the western part of international community decided to react and the NATO launched a military 
intervention in FRY on 24 March 1999.150 The author is not going to discuss in this work the 
(il)legality of this intervention from the perspective of international law, since the main focus of 
this analysis is the scale of violations of human rights that led to the intervention and further 
secession.  
As a result of intervention, the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo was prevented and the Military 
Technical Agreement was signed151  and its main purpose was to provide for security and 
international control by the UN in Kosovo and first the agreement mentioned the resolution 
prepared by the UN Security Council152 Moreover, art. 2, para 2 clearly provided for limitations 
for sovereignty of FRY over its territory: 
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“The international security force ("KFOR") will deploy following the adoption of the 
UNSCR [United Nations Security Council Resolution] ... and operate without hindrance 
within Kosovo and with the authority to take all necessary action to establish and 
maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo and otherwise carry out its 
mission.”153 
Later on, the Resolution 1244 was enacted by the UN and was binding for all Member States 
which shifted the situation into a completely different flow, where FRY and Serbia had to share 
their rights over territory with an alien administration.  
 
2.1.3 Resolution 1244 as a Cornerstone 
 
One of the main sources of law in this case is regarded the Resolution 1244 adopted in 1999 by 
the United Nations.154 It was enacted as a result of military actions of the NATO against 
Yugoslavia and the main purpose was to provide interim administration for Kosovo in order to 
find peaceful ways of solvation of the conflict. The temporary authority on territory of Kosovo 
was called the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The 
resolution itself prevented Yugoslavia from any actions and sovereign powers in Kosovo.155 
The Resolution 1244 was designed in such a way that it established a semi-independent 
governance over Kosovo in order to stabilize the situation in the region. Its provisions gave a 
wide range of competences to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and to 
UNMIK:  
1. All legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosovo, including the 
administration of the judiciary, is vested in UNMIK and is exercised by the Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General. 
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2. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General may appoint any person to 
perform functions in the civil administration in Kosovo, including the judiciary, or 
remove such person. Such functions shall be exercised in accordance with the existing 
laws, as specified in section 3, and any regulations issued by UNMIK.156 
Another crucial fact is that the Resolution was adopted in accordance with Chapter VII of the 
UN Chapter. Therefore, it’s power and legal structure was mandatory for all Member States 
which also included the province of Kosovo, at that time a part of Yugoslavia. The resolution has 
never been abolished even after the declaration of independence, which was also mentioned in 
the declaration itself.157 The resolution 1244 contained several key fundamental aspects of 
customary international law. As for example, Article 24, para2 of the UN Charter illustrates the 
correlation between the Resolution and the obligation of the Security Council to act in 
accordance with “the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations” which also include Chapter 
I of the UN Charter. Paragraph 11 of the preamble of the UN Charter says that “Reaffirming the 
commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in Helsinki Final Act/ 
Therefore, it may be concluded, that the Resolution 1244 is based on the most fundamental 
principles of international law. The author will use this thesis in following parts where the 
research will touch upon statements of States supporting the declaration of independence. 
Another reference which the researcher would like to make, is the statement of the International 
Law Commission: "when several norms bear on a single issue they should, to the extent possible, 
be interpreted so as to give rise to a single set of compatible obligations. General law will . . . 
continue to give direction for the interpretation and application of the relevant special law …"158 
The Resolution didn’t change any general law in Kosovo by specifying that the law applicable 
there was still from the legislation adopted before March 24th of 1999.159 However, those legal 
provisions, according to the Resolution, could be modified or changed in accordance with 
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international human rights. Also, the UNMIK had sufficient competences to change the 
applicable law in the region.160 
Taking this all into account, let us analyze the legal side of secession according to the Resolution 
1244 which the author will use here as a reference to main principles of international law. To 
begin with, it is worth to mention the number of references to the principle and right to territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of Yugoslavia. Thus, the operative paragraph 4 mentions Kosovo as a 
part of Yugoslavia ("Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb 
military and police personnel will be permitted to return to Kosovo to perform the functions in 
accordance with annex 2)161 "A political process towards the establishment of an interim political 
framework agreement providing for substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account 
of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ... “ which one more time confirms the importance of territorial 
integrity of Yugoslavia. The Rambouillet accords also note the territorial integrity of FRY.162  
The author points out that on the entire Resolution 1244 the Security Council didn’t put any 
direct mention of the principle of self-determination of the Kosovo Albanian people, however, as 
it has been discussed above, the Resolution itself is built on main principles and values of the 
United Nations, therefore the principle of self-determination is equally present in the Resolution 
along with territorial integrity. However, it is uncontestable, that the Resolution had as one of its 
main objectives to protect territorial integrity of FRY and Serbia through peaceful solvation of 
the conflict.  
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2.1.4 The Declaration of Independence and Secession  
Several final attempts of peaceful settlement took place prior to the final declaration of 
independence. On 12 December of 2003, the world saw new “Standards for Kosovo” adopted by 
the Security Council.163 It was a specific document, which was supported by the contact group 
(The US, Russia, France, Italy and Germany) and conveyed 8 standards necessary to fulfill 
before the final status of Kosovo. The document demanded enforcement and protection of human 
rights of Kosovo Albanians, mentioning such conditions as proper rule of law, economic, social 
and political rights, push towards negotiations with Belgrade.164 Nevertheless, regardless one 
more effort, the plan failed and on 30 November of 2004 the UNSG stated that the 
implementation of standards in current conditions without any additional political support seems 
to be impossible.165 
The further step, which was the first official acknowledgment of necessity of independence also 
known as the “Ahtisaari Plan”. This was an official “Report of the Special Envoy of the 
Secretary General on Kosovo’s Future Status”, which, after analyzing the whole situation 
proposed an independence for Kosovo, yet supervised by international community and 
organizations.166 For this thesis, it is important to notice that the observations of the special 
envoy Ahtisaari mentioned inability of parties to come to a certain conclusion.167 The Kosovo 
Albanians required only independence, however, at that time, under effective control of UNMIK, 
the special envoy didn’t observe any hostilities or human rights violations against Albanians, 
which are, as discussed in this thesis, may be the only reason for “remedial secession”. During 
that period of time, in 2007-2008 it is difficult to say that Kosovo was in need for a remedy as 
UNC secession. Moreover, while Serbia rejected the Ahtisaari Plan, and the “troika”, so-called 
group of the EU, the USA and Russia was supposed to come up with a final decision on status of 
Kosovo on 10 December of 2007.168 Serbian authorities came up with a proposal to give Kosovo 
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the same status as of the Aaland Islands for 20 years. The plan was supposed to give Kosovo 
autonomy and self-government over its territory, internal and external affairs with formal 
participation of Serbia regarding agreements signed by Kosovo. Moreover, Belgrade proposed to 
give complete independence in internal affairs of Kosovo, legislative and social aspects of life of 
Kosovars and more. On the other hand, Serbia will participate only in protection its sovereign 
borders, Serbian traditional heritage and a number of other minor “Serbian” factors in Kosovo.169  
The researcher here notes that this proposal is an adequate step forward towards peaceful 
settlement of conflict while not breaching the principle of territorial integrity. While the state of 
affairs before 1999 as well as some period after was close to be called in extremis violations of 
human rights of an ethnical minority, now, with this final proposal of Serbia, there was nothing 
close to conditions necessary for a remedial secession. The final events, where the Resolution 
1244 was considered as a failed plan and the open call for independence from the EU and the 
USA only confirmed the presence of political will behind this secession, while the right to self-
determination, violations of human rights and other factors which seem to overlap with the 
phenomenon of secession are absent. On 17 February 2008 Kosovo unliterally declared 
independence.170 
If we test this secession by using those criteria stated in the beginning of this chapter, it will 
show that the secession meets all of them. Ethnically, Albanians who live in Kosovo have certain 
distinction and their own identity different from Serbs. They have different culture and 
language.171 What’s crucial here to mention for this thesis is that if we consider Kosovo 
Albanians’ identity in relation with native Albanians, it would provide for merging with Albania 
or other bigger similar state (theoretically). The author emphasized this point or so-called 
condition, since it plays a big role in other cases discussed in this work. With this condition in 
mind, one may assume that the very purpose of right to secession may be regarded from a 
different angle, providing for more options for secessionists and more action for intervening 
States which are interested in protection of their ethnical minorities.   
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The case of Kosovo had a very controversial recognition in the world and divided the 
international community on two main opposing sides. While Eastern and Western states were 
trying to prove each other wrong, both sides were using international law as the main legal 
source for either to deny or to justify this secession. Thus, here the author refers to some 
statements made in the Security Council on 18th February 2008172: Serbia claimed that the 
declaration of independence by provisional Institutions of Self-Government of the province of 
Kosovo was completely illegal, moreover, referring to resolution 1244 (1999) which provided 
for territorial integrity of the sovereign Serbia.173 In addition, the main supporter of Serbia, 
which was and still is Russian Federation claimed that the unilateral declaration of independence 
was a harsh violation of international law and breach of the main principles of the UN Charter. 
(p.6), while on the other hand, the states supporting secession claimed diametrically contrary. 
For example, the United States stated that the declaration of independence is based on legal, 
logical and fair grounds. The most interesting statement which is also crucial for this research is 
that the ”Kosovo's declaration is fully consistent with resolution 1244 (1999) and expressly 
recognizes that that resolution will remain in force”174 Why is it important? Perhaps, the analysis 
of the resolution demonstrates that if the unilateral declaration of independence is legally 
accepted by the declaration, it could mean that the United Nations officially allow the secession 
under the UN Charter. Along with the US, France was one of the biggest supporters of this 
declaration of independence. Eventually, we have two opposing sides which are using the same 
source of international law to deny or justify the same action. Does it have something to do with 
direct human rights violation as a ground for this secession? Partially yes, but in this case, the 
secession was not regarded as a remedy in the sense discussed in the first part of this thesis. On 
the contrary, as it has been shown above in this chapter, the UNC secession and declaration of 
independence are a result of numerous political interventions. The author may conclude that in 
case of Kosovo the international community created an artificial precedent with a composition of 
various norms of international law, numerous doubtful actions and at some extend direct 
violation of international law.  
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2.2 Russian Perspective on Secession 
2.2.1 Crimea 
 
“1. Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine violates international law. 2. No one is going to do 
anything about it.”175 
 
The author chose this case as an “antagonist” for Kosovo to demonstrate different perspectives of 
the same process. While the previous case had long-lasting documented violations of human 
rights, huge efforts towards peaceful settlement and it took many years before the international 
community came up with the final status of Kosovo. Conversely, the case of Crimea may seem a 
ridiculous sequence of events with more or less the same principles and outcome as was with 
Kosovo. This case is chosen in order to demonstrate different concepts of UNC secession and to 
illustrate the fact that the very proportionality between violation of human rights and the right to 
secession is quite an abstract, if not an illusionary thing. The main goal here is to analyze and 
determine the mechanism of international law applicable for the cases used in this work, 
therefore the author disclaims any political context in this work. Therefore, one will not find 
such answers as who is a peacemaker and who is the aggressor, or which secession is legitimate 
and which is not. The author will try to illustrate the facts and explain them using international 
law.  
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2.2.2 Historical Background 
 
Crimean Peninsula has a long-lasting history with constant changes in authority and identity 
which worth a discussion of a history textbook, however in this thesis the author would like to 
point out at the most important historical fact for the purposes of the work.  As being a part of 
the Soviet Socialist Ukranian Republic, the number of Russian populations was immensely 
growing in Crimea. In 1991, while the Soviet Union was in process of dissolution, recently 
independent Ukraine decided to grant autonomy to Crimea within Ukraine.176 
While before 2013 all Russian attempts to overtake the independence in Crimea didn’t finish 
with success, in the very 2013, during the Ukranian crisis the new hope occurred.177 At first, the 
protests taking place in Ukraine after rejection of Agreement with European Union, took a 
peaceful nature, however later on tensions grew and in 2014 the protest turned into a riot.178 The 
protesters requested the Ukrainian government to resign and to organize new presidential 
elections, which, all in all, happened.179 
In 21 Faburary 2014 the former president of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovych’s rule was 
overthrown180 and as it was admitted by Vladimir Putin, Russian troops in conjunction with pro-
Russian activists took over Crimea.181 On 16 March of 2014 the referendum was held asking 
whether the citizens want to accede to Russia as an expression of self-determination.182 This, 
however, proves once more the position of author that self-determination and secession should 
not be put so close one to another in international law. While the whole idea of self-
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determination was the breakthrough in humanity presented by W.Wilson, the contemporary legal 
deformation, unfortunately, led to creation of an excuse for great powers. As this case 
demonstrates, secession is triggered as a result of complicated political games.  
The immediate response of international community was a resolution proposed by the UNSC 
condemning the referendum and deeming it illegal.183 Nevertheless, since it was obvious that 
Russia would veto it, the main purpose was to demonstrate the protest of vast majority of states 
against this secession and annexation. Eventually, when the referendum took place, the UN 
General Assembly adopted a resolution which proclaimed the referendum invalid.184 Finally, the 
“West” of the world imposed wide economic sanctions against Russia.  
What’s important in this case is the clash of pro-European and pro-Russian political sides. Since 
Crimea was populated mainly by Russians, those evidently took the pro-Russian side. 
Eventually, it turned into a conflict between those two.185 In this scenario Russia expressed some 
concerns about safety of Russians in Crimea and on 1 March of 2014, armed forces authorized 
by the Federal Council of the Russian Federation, entered Ukraine pursuing the aim to protect 
Russian population.186 In the end, pro-Russian authorities in conjunction with increased number 
of Russian citizens called for a referendum on 16 March of 2014 and seceded from Ukraine with 
violation of its constitution.187 According to Article 73 of the Constitution of Ukraine, any 
question of changing the territory of Ukraine shall be subject, exclusively, to an all-Ukrainian 
referendum and the only body that can announce such a referendum is Ukraine's parliament. 
Further, in Article 134 of the Constitution, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea is stated to be an 
integral part of Ukraine's territory.188 
The case of Crimean secession presents a kind of unique material to work with. Let us analyze 
this case under those five criteria listed in the beginning of the section. Russian population 
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inhabiting Crimean Peninsula since 19th century constitute a strong claim to self-determination, 
however there were also Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars with distinct identities, different 
languages, cultures and ethnicities. As by 2001, about 60% were Russians, 25 Ukrainians and 10 
Tatars.189 In addition, according to the same source, the language spoken as native in Crimea was 
for 75% of population Russian. So, similarly to Kosovo, in Crimean case Russians fulfilled two 
Dugart’s Criteria which are the majority population and territorial control. 
Now let us turn to the problematic side of the case, which forms a precedent within the analysis 
of this thesis. While in previous case, Kosovo was denied the autonomy and thus internal self-
determination, which at some extent gave them the right to evoke the question of secession, in 
case of Crimea, there was no such violation towards Russian population.190 Next, one of the 
integral parts of every secessionist movement are in extremis human rights violations.191 There 
were no registered cases of intended attacks or other types of aggression towards Russian 
population.192 So, Russia justified its intervention as an early protective measure. Speaking of 
negotiations and exhaustion of all means before secession, no negotiations took place and 
separatists went straightaway to the referendum.193  According to the European Parliament, the 
intervention is deemed to be an act of aggression and moreover, violation of territorial integrity 
of Ukraine which is a violation of customary international law, especially breach of obligations 
set by the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances for Ukraine (1994). The aspect of use 
of force in this case is more problematic since it turned from pre-emptive self-defense into clear 
attacks against certain regions.  
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2.2.3 Crimea and International Law 
 
In order to understand the secession of Crimea it is necessary to list certain key details of state of 
affairs. If we turn to the vote on referendum, it was boycotted by the most of Ukrainian and Tatar 
part Crimea, therefore the overwhelming support towards Russia is not a big surprise.194 
However, the question is, whether the referendum was lawful itself. The answer here may be 
found in the Constitution of Ukraine, more precisely the Article 73, which allows referendums 
on internal matters, however prohibits any changes in territorial borders.195 And the logical 
sequence of any referendum, especially on such a crucial matter is that all or at least the majority 
of the country participate in vote. Moreover, according to the Venice Commission (featured by 
The European Commission for Democracy Through Law) stated that the referendum was 
unconstitutional and the Constitution of Ukraine doesn’t provide for any secessions from its 
territory. Additionally, the Venice Commission confirmed that a referendum which affects 
international borders must be carefully negotiated and conducted with participation of all “stake-
holders”196 
While this secession resulted also in annexation, it is highly important here to understand the 
international mechanisms used in this case in order to take it as a lesson of how it should not be. 
The may be supported by the example of Russian justification which says that prior to 
annexation there was the question of self-determination of Cremeans which resulted in secession, 
moreover, President Putin made direct references to Kosovo.197  
Eventually, using the right of self-determination as a legal ground for referendum prior to 
annexation is the main argument of Russian Federation, thus resulting in two days of Republic of 
Crimea. Since this case has strong evidence of unauthorized presence of foreign armed forces, 
like the one in case with Kosovo, the author now will turn to analysis of legality of this secession 
from the prism of military intervention. As an outcome, the result will be also applied to Kosovo.  
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2.2.4 Legality of Presence of Military Forces 
 
In order to understand the mechanism of presence of foreign military on the territory of a 
sovereign state and later compare it with NATO in Kosovo, it is necessary to understand the 
possible ways of how and when foreign military might be allowed to pass an international 
border.  
First of all, when alien military forces are present on the territory of another state without any 
permission or authorization from the UNSC, it is an illegal act under international law. So, let us 
turn to justifications used by Russia to understand possible mechanisms or gaps available in 
international law. Russia has an access to the Black Sea port in Sevastopol, next, the former 
president of Ukraine invited Russia to cooperate during crisis and finally the doctrine of 
humanitarian intervention. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze every proposed fact.  
Foreign troops may be present under strict conditions with prior authorization or invitation.198 
The position taken by Russian troops in Sevastopol is regulated by a treaty between Russia and 
Ukraine,199 nevertheless the treaty doesn’t provide for the right for a big number of troops to 
enter the territory of Ukraine. Later on, the former, however at the time the legitimate president 
of Ukraine invited Russia to use armed force in order to help with the situation escalating in the 
country.200 While the use of force against another state presupposes violation of international 
borders against the will of another state, in this case it could be assumed that the consent played 
a role of a justification. However, the very consent must be the highest authority, also every 
action by foreign military must be according to the consent.201 However, there was and there is 
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no invitation which would be designed in such a way to bring to secession, even if the 
intervention is aimed to protect the citizens from hostilities.202 
 
While in Kosovo NATO intervention didn’t lead directly to secession and it took somewhat 8 
years until the final status of Kosovo, in this case intervention and secession happened at the 
same time. The statement that Russia is protecting its citizens who live in Crimea, moreover, 
“Russian speaking population”203 cannot presuppose any secession without long and 
comprehensive negotiations as it was in Kosovo. If we consider this situation from the prism of 
humanitarian intervention and self-defense, there must be several conditions in order to deem 
these actions legitimate at some extent. First of all, there must be a real threat and violations 
against people, which however weren’t registered in Crimea.204 Next, while protecting 
endangered people, the actions of intervening party must be aimed on creation of safety 
measures and safe corridors in order to move people from hot battlegrounds, but not in secession 
or actions leading to it.  
Finally, while debating over the concept of humanitarian intervention, it is still highly 
controversial when and how states can use force without authorization of the UNSC. In all other 
scenarios there must be present hard facts of extreme human rights violations which would 
trigger collective responsibility in such cases as genocides and other war crimes. However, those 
cases are usually covered by the UNSC. Therefore, there was no legal and humanistic 
justification for presence of Russian forces in Ukraine, therefore the referendum and secession 
took place unilaterally and under pressure of armed forces, which makes them completely illegal 
from the point of view of international law. While in this work the author listed several necessary 
criteria discussed by scholars and states in favor of UNC secession, the case of Crimea didn’t 
even meet them. Moreover, the autonomy of Crimea wasn’t repealed.  
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2.3 Similar activity with the same pattern 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia 
 
These two vital cases demonstrate a different angle of secession and intervention. While 
analyzing these cases, the author will try to point out all the necessary aspects present in cases to 
derive the statistics for those in order to use them for comparative analysis.  
To begin with, it’s worth to mention that both regions (South Ossetia and Abkhazia) used to be 
autonomous regions of the republic of Georgia with population of 70 000 for South Ossetia and 
240 000 for Abkhazia. Despite the fact that both regions became parts of Georgia after the 
Second World War, Russia was issuing its passports to all ethnical Russians inhabiting the given 
regions. Eventually, ethnic balance was moved towards Russian majority.205 
As a result, the tensions burst out into an internal armed conflict which lasted until early 90s. 
Eventually, two regions unilaterally claimed for autonomy and were supported by Russia.206 In 
1999 Abkhazia and in 2005 South Ossetia declared their independence, which, however, didn’t 
meet any international recognition.207 
During the conflict, Russia played a role of a mediator and planted its peacekeepers in Georgian 
problematic regions. Nevertheless, in 2008, after Georgian attacks committed against South 
Ossetians in Tskhinvali gave to Russia all grounds to commence a military counter-action 
against Georgian troops as an act of protection of its peacekeepers.208 Later on, Abkhazia joined 
the action, along with Russian troops they overthrew Georgian forces and the conflict ended in 
several days. Ceasefire agreement was reached on 12 August 2008 mediated by Nicolas Sarkozy 
who was the president of the European Union. On 26 August 2008, Russia recognized those two 
as independent states, while pointing at the Kosovo precedent.209 
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As a legal justification, Russia brought examples of various international instruments, along 
which the emphasis was made upon the declaration on Principles of International Law 
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations.210 All in all, Russia claimed that the very right to self-determination was 
violated. Consequently, the author may derive that in those cases was used the first theory which 
postulates for a nexus between the right to self-determination and secession.  
Next, in this case one might notice the usual figurant of such conflicts, which is the ICJ, 
however, Georgian application didn’t go any further than procedural stage.211 
Now let’s put these two cases in context of criteria for secession listed in this chapter.  
The first step is to determine whether the peoples of Abkhazia and South Ossetia had different 
identities, taking into account their widespread acceptance of Russian nationality and possession 
of their previous ones. Therefore, speaking of self-determination, it is difficult to establish 
whether the given peoples had any problems of their identity.212 
The 90’s denial of autonomy for Abkhazia and South Ossetia triggered the vast violation of the 
right to self-determination which is uncontestable. Since the 90s conflicts didn’t get sufficient 
attention from the international community, the scale of human rights violations spoken out 
remained low.213 Speaking of negotiations, the last chance of possible dialogue was indeed lost 
after the Georgian attacks.214 
In this case, the intervention performed by Russia may draw a parallel with the same committed 
by NATO. Moreover, Russia claimed to act for the sake of protection of its peacekeepers who 
were attacked by Georgian troops. However, this work will not discuss or condemn further 
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actions of Russia concerning its presence in deeper Georgian territories, since it grows out of the 
scope of this thesis.  
Finally, in this case, Russia had a role of transitional administration, political and military 
support and without Russia those two regions couldn’t get any weight on international arena. 
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Chapter 3: Human Rights, Secession and International Law 
3.1 Enforcement and Regulations Under International Law 
 
The author now turns to discussion of the influence of international law and possible 
enforcement measures for this case. The situation overall might seem dramatic, and it is at some 
extent, since as it will be illustrated (and already is witnessed by the world) the international law 
has not much to offer as enforcement tools for this case. Here we have both secession and 
military intervention with highly doubtful and almost clearly unlawful patters. One may ask a 
question: is the international law then a fiction based on voluntary compliance? As we may see – 
yes, it is. If international law regards all states as equals, it means that all modern states must 
comply with its rules and benefit from it equally. However, this is not the case. As it will be 
established in following, there are certain rules which prove the case of Ukraine unlawful, but 
not much to regulate and sanction this.  
While international law still leaves some room for use of force and intervention, it is highly 
limited by several doctrines, such as the general prohibition of use of force, principle of state 
sovereignty and sovereign borders, responsibility to protect, humanitarian intervention are the 
most general. When an outbreak of violence happens there is a number of mechanisms such as 
nonrecognition and some measures listed in Articles on State Responsibility. Thus Article 22215 
provides for some countermeasures against states committed a wrongful act, Article 41216 
provides for an obligation of nonrecognition of events which resulted as a breach of international 
law and articles 49-54217 list the countermeasures and possible solutions.  However, those 
measures are incomparable with domestic legal systems and enforcement. If we take the 
international investment arbitration, its enforcement is based on domestic legal system. 
Therefore, the enforcement of international law and regulations must be of a special importance, 
especially in such vague and unclear procedures as secession and interventions.  
While analyzing main international mechanism of enforcement in cases of use of force, the UN 
Charter plays an important role. Generally, it is allowed to use force under Chapter VII against 
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actions of aggression and breach of international law, as well is it is allowed to use force in self-
defense.218 The use of force is still one of many measures that might be implemented by the UN, 
moreover, it is the so-called “remedy” which must be used in last pace. As an example, it is 
possible to find many variations of settlement of disputes in Chapter VI and VII prior to use of 
force. Finally, the UNSC is ought to determine all the preconditions prior to authorization of use 
of force and the decision is obligatory.219 The problem of veto and deadlock of the UNSC is an 
issue outside of the scope of this work, therefore, the UNSC is lister by the author as one of 
mechanisms supposed to enforce international law.  
Another way of enforcement of international law in cases of secession is prescribed by 
customary international law. Nonrecognition, sanction, diplomatic measures may have a good 
service in case if the international community is willing to settle the breach of international law. 
However, those measures require individual participation of states, which makes it quite tricky 
due to the main division of the world on pro-East and pro-Western states. As it has been 
mentioned before, the Articles on State Responsibility by International Law Commission express 
generally customary international law.220 Basically, the Article 22 says that the countermeasures 
may be enacted against internationally wrongful acts, however if it is in compliance with articles 
49-51. Also, countermeasures must be implemented only in relation of that state which is a 
victim of internationally wrongful act. (Art. 49(1)) and yet don’t consider any use of force. (Art. 
49(2) 2. Countermeasures are limited to the non-performance for the time being of international 
obligations of the State taking the measures towards the responsible State.))  
Henceforth, what can be used here against an aggression or aggressor in order to reduce 
violations of both international law and human rights during secessions? While the first possible 
answer that comes to one’s mind is sanctions, that is yet a very controversial measure. While 
Article 54221 allows measures by third states, such as sanctions, however the scale and type of 
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sanctions is still a subject to debates. Since sanctions do not require neither prescriptions from 
the UNSC, nor any decisions by international courts, they also remain a subject of political 
affiliations and confrontation of ideologies among great powers.  
 
3.2 Human Rights and the Right to Secession: Comparative Analysis and Conclusions 
 
After having analyzed two different angles, two different opinions, different ideological 
approaches towards secession under international law and listing possible measures of 
enforcement, the author will try to establish the real relation of human rights violations and the 
right to secession. As it was discussed in this work, UNC secession requires certain 
preconditions and framework222 and even in that case, it is highly controversial, whether the 
secession may be the last resort. However, as it has been illustrated on case studies in this work, 
there are different scenarios, however, with the same outcome as UNC secession.  
In case of Kosovo223 there were registered human rights violations towards a certain group of 
people with the same distinct ethnical, cultural, lingual and historical signs. While Kosovo 
enjoyed autonomy before certain period of history, it had been repealed, which could be 
considered as a certain violation of the right to internal self-determination.224 Military activities 
against Kosovo Albanians made yet another contribution in favor of secession. Putting the long 
analysis in the second chapter short, it may be concluded that the scale of human rights 
violations was uncontestably high before 1999. The situation normalized after 1999, when 
NATO intervention stopped the violations and gave a new start for negotiations towards 
determination of Kosovo status. Suffice it to say that it took over 8 years until the secession took 
place, therefore the debates concerning non-recognition due to intervention are not relevant, 
since the intervention itself didn’t lead to secession. (Unlike in Crimea, South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia)  
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Before 1999, on the scale of 5, where 1 is minor, temporary violation of basic social rights, such 
as lingual and cultural limitations225 and 5 is an open genocide, in Kosovo human rights and 
international law violations may be evaluated as 3.5. The tensions against Kosovo Albanians 
were high enough to trigger international community to act, while certain limitation against 
Albanian226 demonstrated an obvious nationalist policy of Serbians. Therefore, in conjunction 
with hostile militarist policy of Belgrade against Kosovars, here, as also accepted by a solid part 
of international community, the mother state couldn’t provide sufficient conditions for internal 
self-determination. Therefore, the Declaration on Friendly Relations could be applied to this 
situation.  
Nevertheless, after 1999, with implementation of UNMIK and Resolution 1244, political, social, 
economic and military safety of Kosovo was established and enforced by the major international 
organization. Additionally, taking into account all the conditions for negotiations, numerous 
attempts to come to a consensus with Belgrade, by 2008 factual violation of human rights could 
be described as minimal. While the final status of Kosovo was still under question mark, there 
was no need for such a remedy as secession. Moreover, at that time there was no direct influence 
of Serbia over Kosovo and Kosovars, so the author can’t speak of any direct hostilities and 
limitations.  
However, the secession took place and was justified by many states, including the United States, 
France and other big powers. The legality of declaration of independence has been discussed for 
many times and in fact has not much to do with the subject of this thesis, which is the factual 
violations of human rights. Therefore, if according to the first chapter of this thesis, UNC 
secession requires such violations of human rights which may be evaluated as 4.5-5, the state of 
affairs in 2007-2008 could be evaluated as 0. Therefore, it is not a question of human rights 
violation, but the impuissance of international law to provide any sufficient measures in order to 
avoid such illogical and in fact unlawful consequences. 
                                                          
225 See more in UN General Assembly, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
16 December 1966, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 993, p. 3 
226 I.e., limitations on property rights, repeal of autonomy etc. 
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Now the researcher will turn to another school of thought regarding secessions, which is the 
Russian approach towards its neighbors. As it has been shown in this thesis (Chapter 2.2, infra.) 
While this case has diametrically different factual background, it, nonetheless, led to the same 
result. In comparison to another case, here there was no direct human rights violations towards 
Russian-speaking, ethnical Russian and any other Russia-affiliated population. The threat here 
was the possibility of some type of harm taking into account the unstable situation in the country. 
Even though the case was followed by an accession of Crimea to Russian Federation, our 
analysis will touch only upon the moment when the referendum for secession was held and the 
actual condition of human rights at that period of time.  
As this thesis demonstrated, there were no officially registered direct violations of rights of 
Russians, let alone the threat of hostilities and physical harm. Autonomy of Crimea had not been 
removed and there were no visible intentions to do so. Overall, Crimea was not the main focus of 
unstable situation, as Kosovo was a disputed area throughout decades. In this case violation of 
human rights prior to secession may be attributed 0 out of 5, the threat was anticipated but not 
materialized. However, for the safety Russia planted some of its forces on the territory of 
Crimea, which, cannot be paralleled with NATO intervention in 1999 in Kosovo, because the 
latter was a response to direct hostilities committed by Serbs, while the former seemed to have 
another purpose. Intervention of NATO didn’t lead to secession, while in Crimea the presence of 
military forces played a big role in developments, pushing towards referendum and secession, if 
not openly, then indirectly, by the mere fact of presence.  
The two-day Republic of Crimea emerged based on conditions which were extremely far from 
those listed by author, scholars, decided by opinio juris and state practice. Conversely, this case, 
along with South Ossetia and Abkhazia had clear pattern of military interventions and use of 
force which were the main gears towards change of international borders. Henceforth, it is not 
necessary to have level 5 violations of human rights and hostilities in order to use doubtful gaps 
of international law. Both Crimea and Kosovo had minimal violations at the time of secessions 
implemented, which bring the author to conclusion that there are de facto no proper principles of 
proportionality applied between violation of human rights and secession.  
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All in all, these cases demonstrate clear gaps and problems of international law which lead to 
violation of sovereignty, victims as a result of military intervention, unlawful change of 
international borders,  
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Conclusion 
It goes without saying that when one is trying to analyse legal anomalies caused by gaps and 
vagueness in law in conjunction with specific interpretations, it turns into a chaos, since the 
anomaly will remain as it is unless it is legally controlled. Especially, when the case includes 
vast state-practice, has numerous supporters and current ongoing cases on one hand, and 
controversies, collisions with general international law on the other, it becomes quite 
complicated even to establish a certain logical sequence of this anomaly called unilateral non-
colonial secession. The thesis analyzes the legal nature of the phenomenon of secession, links it 
with possible legal justifications, as well as proves the contrary, that secession as a legal 
procedure should be highly controlled by international law.  
The researcher in this thesis had a goal to demonstrate that secession is an independent, separate 
process with unique and different scenarios, however always with the same violent (both legally 
and physically) results. As has been illustrated on the examples of Kosovo, Crimea, South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia, while the cases might have similar patterns, they all had different 
sequence of events that led to secession, however always contrary to the will of mother-state. 
Since the existence of secession as a legal anomaly is incontestable, it was highly important to 
analyze and establish its relation to such a general right as the right to self-determination. While 
in colonial context and in cases of big unifications of states, secession is a logical, sometimes 
constitutionally provided right of civilized societies, it is proved and obvious that the external 
self-determination was a revolutionary step forward in period of decolonization. However, 
during and especially after the Cold War, the phenomenon of self-determination acquired a 
second type, which was called internal self-determination. Another highly important right which 
postulates for equality of nations living on a territory of the same state.  
However, when the right to internal self-determination was used as a justification of unilateral 
secession, it raised a lot of questions and debates. While some scholars and international lawyers, 
as demonstrated in this work, supported this idea, stating that it is the last remedy for oppressed 
nations to avoid violation and hostilities, others claimed that it is a dangerous, somewhat 
nationalistic connection, which may lead (and did to some extend) to horrible consequences, 
such as violation of sovereign borders, constitution and emergence of new unrecognized states. 
Moreover, as it has been established in this thesis, if the right to self-determination is used by 
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one people in order to secede, it definitely violates the right to self-determination of the mother-
state, therefore interconnection of secession and self-determination turns the right to self-
determination into a self-exclusionary right. Therefore, the author concludes that the process of 
secession must be regarded as a legal anomaly outside of the context of internal self-
determination or the relation must be controlled by international instruments. Thus, the research 
question posed in the beginning regarding the relation between self-determination and secession 
has a negative answer. 
Next, the author had yet another crucial research question with a supporting question: Secession, 
is it a remedial legal right prescribed by interpretation of international custom or a result of 
political speculations; and does the secession contains an initiation and certain outcome or it is a 
separate process which leads to various outcomes? First of all, while speaking of unilateral 
secession, it is impossible to attribute the term “right” to it under international law, since any 
secession within colonial or constitutional context is regulated by international law. Everything 
else is at least violation of state sovereignty principle. However, as the practice points at a certain 
document, which is The Declaration on Friendly Relationssovereignty is provided for all states 
which equally protect the rights of all peoples leaving on its territory. While the document is 
non-binding and controversial, it still has a right to exist and be enforced since it postulates for 
general human rights provided by various international covenants and documents. Thus, the 
international community still has a positive obligation to protect the equal rights of all nations 
and peoples living on sovereign territories of states. However, if we speak of secession as a 
remedy, as it has been established in this thesis, the ”instructions” of when, and how this remedy 
must be used are still absent, which leaves a lot of room for political speculations, as has been 
demonstrated in all cases discussed in this work. Confrontation between East and West, 
diametrical difference in opinions and attitude towards secessions demonstrates the uncertain and 
unstable nature of secession and since in this case the international community decides whether 
to support and recognize the secessionist movements, it takes makes it purely politicized.  
Both in Crimea and Kosovo, at the moment of secession were registered very low or no direct 
and hostile violations against Albanians or Russians. While Kosovo was under interim 
administration and Resolution 1244 was in force, since 1999 there was no possibility (no access) 
to do any atrocities against Albanians. As well as in Crimes the situation was very far from in 
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extremis violations against Russians. However, in both cases the secession took place, regardless 
different backgrounds and events. While in case of Kosovo there were a lot of efforts to come to 
a peaceful consensus, propositions of autonomy from Belgrade, in case of Crimea the events 
took very immediate and quick course without sufficient factual background. Nevertheless, in 
both cases the world witnessed de facto unilateral secessions. Therefore, it may be concluded 
that secession has an initiation, such as referendums (legal or illegal), military actions, 
interventions (unauthorized in both cases). The process leads to a certain outcome which is 
violation of sovereign borders with further independence or annexation.  
Finally, taking into account all the conclusions made above, the author may state that there is no 
proportionality between violation of human rights and the right to secession, since secession 
might be based on violations of human rights, and should be a remedy in cases of hostile and 
constant violations against certain group of people, however as the practice shows, the fact of 
secession may exist as an independent phenomenon which requires rather political and military 
support from great powers than direct de facto violations at the moment.  
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